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ABSTRACT. Australia released the newest edition of its Defense White Paper,
describing Canberra’s current and emerging national security priorities, on February
25, 2016. This continues a tradition of issuing defense white papers since 1976. This
work will examine and analyze the contents of this document as well as previous
Australian defense white papers, scholarly literature, and political statements assessing their geopolitical significance. It will also examine public input into Australian
defense white papers and the emerging role of social media in this public involvement.
It concludes by evaluating whether Australia has the political will and economic
resources necessary to fulfill its geopolitical and national security aspirations.
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Introduction
Australia is a significant ally of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and its
small and highly professional armed forces have participated with the U.S. in
many military conflicts and global theaters for the past century. It also has
growing economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions including China’s rise and illegal waterborne immigration. Incorporating these interests and demographic, economic, and political limitations
into defense white papers is a perennial challenge for Australian policy makers
which is exacerbated by it being an island continent heavily dependent on
sea-based trading and lines of communication.1
Australia is a prosperous highly developed democracy which has experienced significant economic growth due booming natural resources exports
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though this growth began slowing in 2015 as China’s economy began declining and due to earlier economic growth declines in the 2010s. Its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) purchasing power parity was estimated to be $1.1
trillion as of 2014; its annual GDP economic growth rate that same year was
estimated at 2.7%; and its per capita GDP that year was estimated at $46,600.
The Australian economy, whose national population was 24,022,042 as of
March 9, 2016, exports key commodities including coal, copper, iron ore,
gold, titanium, meat, wool, alumina, machinery, and transport equipment
with its largest markets broken down by percentage going to the following
nations during 2014:
China
Japan
South Korea
United States

33.7%
18%
7.4%
4.2%2

Canberra’s overall trade deficit was $A2.906 billion ($2.019 billion) seasonally adjusted as of November 1, 2015. Its key imports include machinery and
transport equipment, computers and office machines, telecommunication
equipment and parts; crude oil and petroleum products with Canberra’s
major import suppliers in 2014 being:
China
U.S.
Japan
Singapore
Germany
South Korea
Malaysia
Thailand

20.5%
10.6%
6.8%
5%
4.7%
4.7%
4.4%
4.3%3

Perennial historical challenges in Australian defense planning arise from a
strong tradition emphasizing landpower in Australian military policymaking
and the belief of many that Australia’s status as an island nation heavily
dependent on international trade makes it imperative to emphasize that
Australia is a maritime nation whose seapower needs must be reflected in its
national security policymaking plans and priorities. Reflections of this landmaritime power contentiousness are frequently presented in Australian defense
white papers and analyses of Australian defense policy.4
Defense strategic planning documents have been issued by the Australian
Government since the February 1946 release of Appreciation of the Strategical
Position of Australia with supplemental and updated documents being
produced on a regular basis. A 2012 assessment of Australia’s geopolitical
and strategic worldview makes the following declaration:
Australia’s area of direct military interest covers about ten percent
of the earth’s surface. It extends from the Cocos Islands in the west
18

to the islands in the Southwest Pacific and New Zealand in the east
and from the Indonesian archipelago and Papua New Guinea in
the north to Antarctica in the south. Other than defending our own
territory, the most important strategic objective is to help foster the
stability, integrity, and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood.
As successive defence white papers have noted, Australia would
be concerned about major internal challenges that threatened the
stability of any neighbouring country. In addition, Australian
interests would inevitably be engaged if countries in this region
became vulnerable to the adverse influence of strategic competition
by major powers.5
Australia Centered Strategic Map Emphasizing its Northern Approaches

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

19

Australian Ship Reporting Area and Search and Rescue Responsibilities

Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Australia’s November 1976 white paper was issued during Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser’s (1930–2015) Liberal and Country Party Coalition government and by Defence Minister Sir James Killen (1925–2007). Topics addressed
in this document included Australia’s changing strategic circumstances such
as the United Kingdom increasingly turning to the North Atlantic and
Europe as focal points of its strategic interests; the increasing global growth
of sovereign nation states including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New
Guinea in Australia’s contiguous regions; the Soviet Union’s declining political influence despite retaining tremendous military power; China’s increasing
international outreach and engagement; Southeast Asia’s increasing importance coupled with Vietnamese unification and U.S. military disengagement
from Southeast Asia; the importance of the Australian, New Zealand, and
United States (ANZAC) alliance to the Australia; and Canberra’s need to
build constructive relationships with adjacent countries to sustain security
and stability.6
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Source: Australian Department of Defence

Self-reliance was a key theme and assumption in this document as the following excerpt demonstrates:
A primary requirement emerging from our findings is for increased
self-reliance. In our contemporary circumstances we no longer base
our policy on the expectation that Australia’s Navy or Army or Air
Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation’s
force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution
to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we felt that
our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared
from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are
much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some
distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be
conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence
Force (ADF).
Our alliance with the US gives substantial grounds for confidence
that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security,
US military support would be forthcoming. However, even though
our security may be ultimately dependent upon US support, we
owe it to ourselves to be able to mount a national defence effort
that would maximise the risks and costs of any aggression.7

Subsequent sections of this document provided detailed projections of Australian military force requirements, included funding estimates to meet this
goal of self-reliance in areas such as maritime surveillance, reconnaissance,
and offshore patrol, naval air warfare, land defense, manpower levels, operational readiness, defense facilities, requisite defense science and technology
21

assets, defense industry support, equipment acquisition, assistance to United
Nations and international partners, and manpower expenditure.8
The 1976 defence white paper was criticized as being unaffordable and
providing little detail on how the government planned to use the force structure proposed by this document. A more recent assessment of this document
contends that it described Australia’s primary strategic concern as being
adjacent maritime areas Southwest Pacific countries and territories, Papua
New Guinea, Indonesia, and the Southeast Asian region; extending from the
Indian Ocean’s Cocos Islands to New Zealand covering almost 10% of the
earth’s surface; and also noting that the Indonesian archipelago and Papua
New Guinea could be staging areas in potential offensive military operations
against Australia.9

Courtesy: Australian Department of Defence

Although not an official Australian defense white paper the 1986, Dibb
Review of Australian defence capabilities is another important document examining Australian defense aspirations and strategic interests and Canberra’s
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ability to match these multiple objectives. Written by Australian National
University Professor Paul Dibb for the Labour Government of Bob Hawke
(1983–1991), this document was commissioned by Defence Minister Kim
Beazley in 1985 and released in June 1986. Its contents included feedback
from the Department of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Chiefs
of the Air and Naval Staffs, submissions from state and national governments,
industry, national organizations, retired officers, and private individuals.10
Dibb mentioned seeing no need for Australia to make drastic defense
policy changes maintaining that force structure adjustments can be made
progressively in the subsequent five years and beyond. Contending that Australia was not imminently threatened, he asserted that Australia should strive
to develop a more independent combat capability. He stressed the criticality
of Australia’s close relationship with the U.S. through the ANZUS pact
providing Canberra with access to U.S. intelligence, surveillance, defense
science, weapons, and logistics support. This document went on to mention
that it could not obtain information from the Department of Defence on the
strategic rationale for a 12-destroyer Navy, three fighter squadrons, six regular
Army battalions, and an Army Reserve personnel target size of 30,000.11
Additional findings and recommendations contained within this document’s executive summary included there being no conceivable prospect of a
power invading Australia and subjugating the continent; the need for a
hostile power to take at least ten years and have massive external support to
invade Australia; that Australia requires the ability to detect, identify, and
track potentially hostile forces within its area of direct military interest which
was becoming more feasible due to the emergence of over-the-horizon radar;
that priority should be given to intelligence, maritime, and electronic-warfare
forces; and that possessing strike and interdiction capabilities is one of the
best means for Australia to demonstrate its military advantage. Dibb also
advocated enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect critical
areas in southern waters including the Bass Strait, Freemantle, Sydney, and
Cape Leeuwin; that at least two fighter squadrons were necessary for continental air defense; that ground forces should protect military and infrastructure
assets supporting air and maritime power projection; that ground forces
should be primarily infantry, lightly armed, and air mobile; that Australian
industry should plan for potential overseas supply disruption; that the Cocos
and Christmas Islands and Papua New Guinea are the only external threat
contingencies which should be included in force structure planning; and that
new capital equipment expenditures may require an addition $A 1.3 billion
($983.9 million) and that only modest changes need to be made in the Defence
Department’s plans to increase defense spending 3.1% between 1986–1991.12
This document received praise and criticism from various sources. Proponents favored its emphasis on defending the north-sea air gap to Australia’s
23

north and east and emphasizing placing greater self-reliance in national
defense capabilities. Critics stressed concern that Dibb placed insufficient
emphasis on offensive capabilities which they worried would see Australia
facing an mobile aggressor with hands tied behind its back; that the ADF
would be overly restricted; could not pose a deterrent; would not provide
western leadership in the wider Southeast Asian or South Pacific area; and
would act on a more reactive instead of proactive basis; and that it was
necessary for Australia to gain air superiority by counter-air operations against
aircraft on the ground, air bases, and supporting infrastructure.13
The following year the Hawke Government and Beazley produced The
Defence of Australia white paper. This document stressed the importance of
Australia achieving self-reliance in defense planning and giving Australia
the military capability to prevent an aggressor from attacking air and sea
approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of national territory, and having
the ability to extort concessions from Australia through using military force.
This document also stressed Canberra’s desire to have forces capable of
tracking and targeting adversaries by mounting offensive and defensive operations including air defense, mine countermeasures, and protecting coastal
trade with mobile land forces capable of meeting and defeating armed
incursions at remote locations.14

Source: Australian Department of Defence

Additional emphases of this document included stressing development of
Jindalee over-the-horizon radar with three new stations being planned to
facilitate around-the-clock surveillance of Australia’s northern approaches,
expanding naval surface combat ships from twelve to sixteen or seventeen
24

and developing a new warship class with range and armament to operate in
areas beyond Australia’s geographic contiguousness; acquiring six new submarines; and establishing the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as a two ocean
fleet with major portions being based in Western Australia. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was projected to have long-range strike forces of
F-111 bombers and F/A-18 fighters with basing for these squadron planned
for Tindal near Darwin, Derby in northwestern Australia, and Cape York
Peninsula. Army enhancements proposed in this document included strengthening the Townsville, QD-based Operational Deployment Force; permanently
basing major elements of the Australian Army in the north including a fastmoving cavalry regiment of 340 personnel in Darwin, NT; and increasing
the number of Blackhawk helicopters.15
A 2006 assessment of this document praised its declaration that Australia
must have the ability to defend itself against air and sea attacks and from
gaining control of territory.16 However, a 1990 analysis of the 1987 defence
white paper criticized it for not providing clear costs estimates for meeting
its goal of Australian self-reliance and for not providing sufficient funding to
meet these objectives with an estimated budget shortfall of $A 2 billion
($1.514 billion) over four years, capital equipment expenditures falling from
27.1% of defense spending in 1986–1987 to 21.5% in 1989–1990, and seeking
to reduce the number of personnel in defense establishments while hoping to
increase their productivity.17
The Defence of Australia also received criticism from the Labour Government’s conservative parliamentary critics. Representative Alexander Downer
(LIB-Mayo) expressed concern about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s
desire to become more involved in the Pacific and about the white paper’s
increasing emphasis on integrating with Asia by mentioning that Australia is
part of the western security alliance and should be proud of its part in promoting international security. He proceeded to stress the critical importance
of joint Australian-U.S. facilities at the North-West Cape and Pine Gap, that
Australia should not worry about whether visiting American and Australian
ships carry nuclear weaponry, and that the government should stand up and
resist peace movement arguments promoting moral equivalence between the
West and the Soviet Union.18
The next Australian defence white paper was issued in November 1994
by Prime Minister Paul Keating’s Labour Party Government and Defence
Minister Robert Ray.
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Source: Australian Department of Defence

Defending Australia stressed how the Cold War’s conclusion had ended the
threat of war between the U.S. and former Soviet Union as a threat to
Australian security. It went on to emphasize that while Australian security
could still be threatened by European and Middle East events, that there was
greater likelihood of Australian security being threatened by Asia-Pacific
developments. Defending Australia noted that the Korean Peninsula and
South Asia remained areas of international tension and potential conflict,
acknowledged the presence of competing nations and territorial claims in the
South China Sea; and that despite repression in countries such as Cambodia
stable Asia-Pacific strategic relations and economic growth has enabled countries to evolve on a more stable basis.19
Specific commitments to enhancing Canberra’s military capability made
in this document included making defense spending 2% of Australian GDP
for five years beginning in 1996–1997 without providing program specific
expenditure estimates; beginning planning of potential defense needs until
2010; strengthening northern barrier defense capabilities, stressing the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to Australian strategic interests
while enhancing security ties with the U.S.; including specific quantitative
measurements for ADF branches such as 11 destroyers and frigates and 6
Collins Class submarines for the RAN; 103 Leopard 1A3 tanks and 771 M113
armored vehicles for the Australian Army, and 3 tactical fighter squadrons
with 52 F/A-18 aircraft and 2 strike reconnaissance squadrons with 17
F111C aircraft, and two maritime patrol squadrons with 19 P3C aircraft for
the RAAF.20
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A positive critique of Defending Australia noted that Australia would have
to pay enhanced attention to short-warning conflicts which may require
potential deployment of Australian forces to contiguous geographic regions.
It also noted that this document’s guidance to ADF forces being provided
with sufficient numbers and ability to be deployed regionally was restricted
by “regional interests” being expanded from the immediate neighborhood to
the broader Asia-Pacific region. 21 Additional praise for this document was
found in its plans to expand regional security partnership with Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries including Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore along with Canberra’s plans to support international peacekeeping missions in areas as varied as the Persian Gulf, Namibia, Cambodia,
Somalia, Rwanda, and the South Pacific.22
Criticism of Defending Australia was provided in parliamentary debate
on December 7, 1994 by opposition defense critic Peter Reith (Lib-Flinders).
He noted what he saw as a decline in capabilities and operational and personnel readiness under the Labour Government commenting that since a 1991
force structure review that the Army had lost two of six infantry battalions
and that Defending Australia proposed restoring one of these battalions by
stripping manpower from other depleted ADF assets which he described as
robbing Peter to pay Paul when Paul is already impoverished. He also criticized Labour’s plans to extend strategic horizons to from Southeast Asia to
Northeast Asia as rhetoric which cannot be backed up with effective action.23
1996 saw the end of 13 years of Labour Party Government with the
election of the conservative coalition of the Liberal and National parties.
Led by Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007) (LIB-Bennelong) and
Defence Minister Ian McLachlan (LIB-Barker), this government published
the Australian Strategic Review in 1997. Highlights of this document included
stressing the global nature of Australian strategic interests while emphasizing
the importance of basing security on conditions in contiguous countries as
stressed by this following assertion:
… Australia’s most direct strategic interests continue to include
the stability, safety and friendly disposition of the countries closest
to us – the inner arc of islands from Indonesia in the west through
to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Southwest
Pacific. Any substantial military attack on Australia would most
easily be mounted from or through these islands. Australia’s relative
safety from armed attack at present owes much to the common
interests we share with these countries, and to freedom from
external pressures on their sovereignty.24
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This document went on to emphasize that key foundational elements of Australian national security included:
 The centrality of the Asia-Pacific region to our security.
 The significance of economic growth in East Asia to our strategic environment.
 The challenge of new power relations which result from that growth.
 The special importance of the relationships between China, Japan and the
United States for the security of the whole region.
 The unique place Indonesia has in shaping our strategic environment.
 The importance of maintaining, as an integral part of our wider international policies, a strategic posture which includes both the maintenance of
effective defence capabilities and the maintenance of active involvement in
regional strategic affairs.25
Australia’s Strategic Policy proceeded to describe Canberra’s key AsiaPacific strategic interests as being:
 Helping avoid destabilizing strategic competition between the region’s
major powers;
 Helping prevent the emergence of a security environment dominated by
any power(s) with antagonistic strategic interests;
 Helping maintain a benign southeast Asian security environment, especially in maritime Southeast Asia, which protects the territorial integrity of
all regional countries; and
 Helping prevent the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.26
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On December 2, 1997 Representative William Taylor (LIB-Groom) praised
Australian Strategic Policy for emphasizing the following four priority areas
for ADF development: effectively exploiting information technologies to
allow Australia to use its small forces to maximum effectiveness; developing
military capabilities to defeat future threats to national air and maritime
approaches; maintaining an effective defense force strike capability; and
developing capabilities to defeat threats within Australian territory.27
However, concerns about this document expressed by Labour Party figures
that stressed the Howard Government should place more emphasis on remote
crisis areas such as the Mideast instead of the contiguous inner arc and
Australian Strategic Policy was also faulted for the ADF’s projected strength
of 50,000 being insufficient to carry out expanded security requirements
expected of it by this document and the expected absence of new funds to
execute its responsibilities.28
Although the next Australian defence white paper would not be released
until 2000, its contents would be significantly influenced by Canberra’s 1999
military intervention into East Timor. In August 1999, people of this country
voted to be an independent country and separate themselves from Indonesia.
Pro-Indonesian militias responded violently by killing pro-independence East
Timorese and trying to deport other areas of Indonesia. The United Nations
Security Council passed resolution 1264 on September 15, 1999 authorizing
the creation of an Australian-lead International Force in East Timor
(INTERFET) to restore order and provide humanitarian relief to this newly
independent country. Australian force size in this operation reached a peak
of 5,700 in 1999 and a Canberra retained a residual military presence in this
country until November 22, 2012.29
Australian intervention and sustainment in INTERFET was considered
relatively successful in establishing some level of stability in East Timor and
representing the most decisive Australian regional military intervention in
Southeast Asia since World War II. It was also aided by Indonesia’s decision
not to resist the intervention. However, the decision-making leading up to
the intervention has been criticized as have ADF capabilities in being able to
execute and sustain such missions including large-scale counterinsurgency
operations. Additional criticism of Australian participation in INTERFET
has also focused on the interoperability of the ADF with coalition forces in
future multinational operations. This operation also forced the ADF to deploy
nearly half of the Army’s combat force on extremely short notice to face
irregulars with limited military assets. INTERFET occurred so quickly that
the ADF had to borrow camouflage suits, night vision goggles, and water
purification plants from the U.S. due to supply shortages.30
December 6, 2000 saw the release of Australia’s next defence white paper
under the aegis of Prime Minister Howard and Defence Minister John Moore
29

(LIB-Ryan). Entitled Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force this document
stressed that the ADF’s primary objective was defending Australian territory
from credible attack without relying on another country’s combat forces. This
emphasis on a self-reliant strategy stressed developing a maritime strategy to
control air and sea approaches to the continent by denying them to hostile
ships and aircraft and provide maximum freedom of action to the ADF. It
assigned a vital and central role to ADF land forces in assisting ADF air and
sea forces in implementing this maritime strategy. This document also stressed
that Australia would take a highly proactive approach to secure a rapid and
favorable result and end to hostilities. Defence 2000 also stressed making a
major contribution to securing Australia’s neighborhood, being able to operate
in adjoining countries if requested by host governments, using preponderant
force if military action is required, contributing effectively in coalitions to
international crises in areas far away from Australia, and providing indigenous coastal surveillance and emergency management support Defence 2000
also stressed a concentric circles security model focusing on a hierarchy of
five interests and associated objectives including:
 Ensuring the defense of Australia and its direct approaches.
 Fostering immediate neighborhood security.
 Promoting Southeast Asian stability and cooperation.
 Supporting strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region.
 Supporting global security.31

Source: Australian Department of Defence

Examples of Australian involvement in international peacekeeping missions
since 1956 has spanned areas as far flung as Afghanistan/Pakistan, Cambodia,
Namibia, the Sinai, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, and Western Sahara as
the following chart demonstrates:
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Source: Australian Department of Defence.32

This white paper sought to increase Australian defense spending by $A500
million in 2001–2002 ($261 million) and $A1 billion ($523.212 million) in
2002–2003 and increase by $A 23 billion ($17.450 billion) over the next
decade. Parliamentary supporters of this white paper such as Representative
Kay Hull (NAT-Riverina) stressed that Defence 2000 detailed Australia’s need
to invest in deployable defense forces capable of protecting Australia in land,
sea, and air combat and to upgrade its forces to maintain pace with evolving
technologies and capabilities. Representative Gary Hardgrave (LIB-Moreton)
stressed the consultative nature of this report emphasizing how public input
was sought and obtained for report contents. Parliamentary criticism of
Defence Australia on February 28, 2001 by Representative Laurie Ferguson
(LAB-Werriwa) criticized the government for its pre-East Timor intervention
statement that ADF strength of 42,500 was sufficient while it now contended
that personnel strength of 54,000 was required. Ferguson also added that
current force separation rates meant that by 2010 the ADF would be 12,000
personnel short of desired levels. He also criticized the government for what
he contended was poor morale in defense warehouses due to plans to outsource defense functions.33
Defence 2000 also received bracing criticism in many scholarly assessments. One analysis noted that while this document stressed the revolution in
military affairs, missile proliferation, failed states, and transnational crime, it
contained little analysis of the varying implications these challenges had on
how Australia would manage its complex and changing security environment. It was critical of the White Paper asserting that Australia should have
a balanced and conventional approach to meeting divergent threats.34
Another critical assessment maintained that Defence 2000 maintained an
ambivalent attitude toward Indonesia as a possible threat to Australian security
if Jakarta would revert to authoritarian rule; that it did not address how Aus31

tralia would respond if the U.S. requested it to provide military assistance if
China attacked Taiwan and consider how China might seek to punish Australia if it supported the U.S. in such a contingency; and whether Australia
can economically afford to defend itself in an conventional military conflict.
This writer also stressed that the war on terror was a misleading metaphor
and that police efforts would be more important than ADF operations.35
A final harsh assessment of Defence 2000 argued that the maritime
strategy associated with this document did not account for what the author
considered the declining strategic relevance of geography and proliferating
non-state challenges to state security. Its author contended that Australia’s
northern air-sea gap could not be defended in a world of technological
profusion, protean crime, epidemic diseases, illegal migration, and terrorist
attacks such as the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing killing 88 Australians.
This analysis also contended that a true maritime strategy to control sea lines
of communication and contain continental powers was beyond Australia’s
capability. It advocated that future ADF capabilities should emphasize greater strategic reach and off-shore deployments beyond Canberra’s immediate
neighborhood to support wider security interests, that the ADF must be
trained and structured to defend Australia from conventional military attack,
counterterrorism, participate in complex peace operations, and defend against
weapons of mass destruction, and that technological superiority must be
usable and appropriate for new and old wars and that future conflicts will
emphasize lower cost, modular, multi-purpose platforms equipped with miniaturized missiles and drones, lethal microbots, and various precision guided
munitions supported by Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and real-time sensor-to-shooter
architecture.36
Australia’s next defense white paper would be issued in 2009 by the government of Kevin Rudd (LAB-Griffith which defeated Howard’s conservative
coalition government in the 2007 elections. During the preceding decade, the
ADF participated in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while
also intervening in the Solomon Islands to prevent internecine strife in that
Pacific Island country from causing the collapse of governmental authority.
Numerous assessments exist on the propriety of these operations and their
successes and failures.37
Prior to issuing the 2009 White Paper, the Rudd Government announced
on May 7, 2008 that it was directing a formal evaluation of the effectiveness
of the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) to see that this entity was
carrying out its mission to provide effective value for Australian defense
spending, achieve better results for the ADF, greater transparency and
accountability, and improved efficiency and effectiveness. This review, known
as the Mortimer Review, was compiled by University of Sydney Professor
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David Mortimer, and it released its findings on September 18, 2008. Review
findings included inadequate project management resources in DMO’s
Capability Development Group; inefficiencies in the process leading to
governmental approvals for new projects; insufficient DMO personnel; and
delays due to inadequate industry capacity, and introducing equipment into
full service.38
Recommendations for improving Australian defense spending accountability and efficiency included:
 Defence preparing an annual submission detailing current and future
defense capability gaps and their remediation priority for government consideration and approval.
 The Defence Chief Financial Officer should assure Defence Capability
Plan Affordability including its impact on future personnel and operating
costs as part of annual defense budget considerations.
 The capability development process should be expedited to allow the
National Security Committee to focus on major issues and a subordinate subcommittee created to handler minor and simpler defense acquisition matters.
 The Capability Development Group should be sufficiently financed in
terms of workforce numbers and skills to develop capability proposals and
incorporate specialist advice from the Defense Materials Organisation and
Defense Science and Technology Organisation; and
 The Government should work with industry and State Governments to
address defense industry skills shortages.39
The 2009 white paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century:
Force 2030 was issued by Rudd and Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon (LABHunter) and released on May 2, 2009. Defending Australia in the AsiaPacific Century was prepared during the post-2008 international financial
crisis. One significant change in this document from its predecessors was
speculating about the possibility of a major power adversary (potentially
China) attacking Australia while stressing that Canberra’s major strategic
priorities remained defending Australia against direct armed attack and
ensuring the stability, security, and cohesion of its immediate neighborhood.
Defending Australia emphasized a commitment to maintaining Indonesian
territorial integrity saying a weakened and fragmented Indonesia could
threaten Australian national security. This document also stressed concern
about challenges facing the Southwest Pacific and East Timor stemming from
economic stagnation, political and social instability, weak governance, and
crime. It also stressed concern of Fijian military interference in the democratic process while mentioning ongoing security cooperation with New
Zealand in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.40
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To address these emerging security challenges Rudd’s Government decided
to acquire 12 new submarines to be built in South Australia as part of a
program expanding three decades with these Future Submarines having
greater range, longer patrol endurance, and capabilities beyond those of the
current Collins class submarines. Examples of these expanded capabilities
include strategic strike; mine detection and mine laying operations; intelligence collection; and supporting special forces with infiltration and exfiltration missions. This document also committed to enhancing Australia’s
surface fleet by acquiring three air warfare destroyers and a fleet of eight
Future Frigates. It committed to maintaining an Army force of three combat
brigades with around 4,000 troops consisting of battalion sized units and enhancing Army deployment, lead time, and sustainment capabilities through
the Adaptive Army Initiative. The Air Force was slated to benefit from the
2010 arrival of the F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter and the acquisition of
approximately 100 F-35 fifth generation fighters, and the Growler E-A 18G
electronic warfare aircraft.41
During September 8, 2009 debate on the defense science and technical
provisions of Defending Australia Minister for Defense Personnel, Material,
and Science Greg Combet (LAB-Charlton) maintained that the government
had given defense scientists greater freedom to design and develop new
technologies and developing new roles for them in analyzing technical risk
and designing risk management and risk mitigation strategies to enhance
defense capabilities. However, MP Bob Baldwin (LIB-Paterson), while acknowledging what he saw as possible developments in the Defence Science
and Technology Organisation (DSTO), stressed concern about $A20 billion
34

($16.803 billion) cuts in defense spending with DSTO experiencing a 50%
annual budget reduction from $A26 million ($21.844 million) to $A13
million ($10.922 million) and that such cuts would have injurious effects on
defense workforce health and safety conditions.42
Components of Defending Australia were also praised and criticized in a
series of articles in the Australian security policy journal Security Challenges.
One assessment praised the white paper for examining national security
policy objectives out to 2030, for the Rudd Government’s commitment to
maintain annual 3% defense budget increases, and for its determination that
the U.S. will remain the world’s most preeminent military power until 2030
and that no other great power will be able to challenge U.S. East Asian
primacy in the near term.43
A second assessment mentioned how climate change, pandemics, drugs,
and internationally organized crime need to be factored into national security
policy planning. It went on to criticize Force 2030 for failing to discuss the
evolving relationship between hard and soft power as a conditioning factor
in emerging military operations. This appraisal also faulted this document
for not emphasizing that successful counterinsurgency operations requires
isolating civilian communities from insurgents, and providing education,
health, and well-being to give civilian communities reason to oppose insurgents and that Force 2030 fails to suggest how such solutions can be achieved
as matters of policy and strategy.
In addition, this analyst also criticized Force 2030 for an insufficient
subtlety in confronting the emergence of ideological conflict in the form of
Islamist absolutism; emerging and differing forms of national power; the
acute unpredictability in which cultural, economic, ideological, and social
forces might interact; ignores the role of culture in strategic pathology; and
the global strategic system’s vulnerability to individual leaders whims and
decisions.44
A third Security Challenges assessment of Force 2030 faulted it for
imprecisely defining how interests in Chapter 5 relate to policy precepts in
Chapter 6 and tasks defined in Chapter 7. Specifically, it declared that Force
2030 failed to define what are unique Australian national interests, that it was
ambiguous in determining how interests impact ADF force priorities, and
that there is major and consequential confusion about whether Australia’s
strategic objective should be defending the continent against the forces of a
major Asian power only against forces Indonesia might use. This analysis also
criticized Force 2030 for failing to mention neighboring countries denying
access to military bases to potentially hostile powers that this document’s
emphasis on militarily protecting shipping lanes and sea-borne trade by
major or middle tier powers is extremely difficult and beyond the existing
Australian military capabilities.45
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In October 2012, the Government of Prime Minister Julia Gillard (LAB-Lalor)
who had ousted Rudd in a 2010 internal party dispute released Australia in
the Asian Century white paper. This document stressed the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in Australian foreign and national security
policy. National security topics stressed in this document included recognizing that future Australian prosperity is critically linked to developments
in this region; that the region’s security environment is shifting in response
to regional economic growth, changing national strategic power, and the
behavior of non-state actors; that Canberra will promote cooperative arrangements among regional nations as the economic and strategic landscape shifts;
and that Australia supports China’s participation in regional economic,
political, and strategic development. Australia in the Asian Century went on
to emphasize that Australia would continue working closely with the U.S. to
ensure Washington maintains a strong and consistent regional presence; that
global and regional institutions were central for developing regional collective
security, building trust, and supporting norms and rules; that the East Asia
Summit would be a crucial regional institution for managing regional security
challenges; and that Australia seeks to increase human security by developing resilient markets for basic human needs including energy, food, and water,
and grappling with climate change. 46
One assessment of this document praised it for stressing that India could
play a positive role in Canberra’s security interests while urging Australia
place increased importance on building a strong strategic arc linking the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. This analysis also criticized Australia in the Asian Cen36

tury for ignoring controversies in Australian immigration policies including
stopping illegal seaborne immigration and detaining immigrants and for not
addressing North Korean nuclear and cyber rattling.47
The next Australian defense white paper Defending Australia and Its
National Interests was released May 3, 2013 by Gillard who would be
toppled by Rudd the following month and Defence Minister-Stephen Smith
(LAB-Perth) and incorporated public consultation in its compilation and
preparation. It also was issued in the aftermath of an $A20 billion ($20.741
billion) defense funding loss between 2009 and 2012 due to the Australian
economy entering into a budget deficit consequently dropping Australian
defense spending below 2% GDP. Topics addressed in this document included
matters affecting Australia’s strategic outlook including the Indo-Pacific,
adverse effects of the global financial crisis, Southeast Asia, and North Asia,
the Indian Ocean, regional military modernization, terrorism, climate change
and resource security, Antarctica, technological development implications for
the ADF, and cyber war. It defined the four key tasks of Australian defense
as:
 Deterring and Defeating Attacks on Australia
 Contributing to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor
 Contributing to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific
 Contributing to military contingencies supporting global security.48

Courtesy: Lowy Institute
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This white paper also stressed drawing done ADF personnel from overseas
operations in the Mideast, Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands;
maintaining ADF capabilities with particular emphasis on excellence in conventional combat operations; ensuring ADF capability development meets
current and future needs; providing timely and accurate intelligence support
to ADF decision-makers; and enhancing allied interoperability. Additional
aspirations of this document included maintaining ADF force strength of
approximately 59,000; increasing the defense budget to 2% of GDP, providing longer warning time of threats to the continent; enhancing force surge
capability; and dispersing base locations to ensure they align with strategic
requirements and ensure critical capabilities; that bases be located near industry and strategic infrastructure; incorporating a U.S. Marine Corps rotational
force at Darwin; and since 2009 approving over 125 new proposals for new
and enhanced defense capabilities worth over $A 17.3 billion ($12.347 billion)
including C-17 heavy lift aircraft, F/A-18 F combat aircraft, Bushmaster
protected mobility vehicles, and two large amphibious/sea vessels. Anticipated future purchases include three Air Warfare destroyers, two landing dock
helicopter amphibious ships, and two F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft.49
This white paper was released a few months before the 2013 election
ousting the revolving door Labour governments of Gillard and Kevin Rudd
who toppled Gillard in a partisan battle to become Prime Minister again in
June 2013. Consequently, this document received limited parliamentary discussion. On May 14, 2013 Representative Nick Champion (LAB-Wakefield)
asked Smith how the defense white paper outlined a plan providing for Australian security. Smith responded saying Defending Australia described the
formation of an Indo-Pacific strategic entity reflecting the rise of China and
India; stressed the importance of the U.S.’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific; and
stressed that Australia remained the world’s 13th largest defense spending
country even though this spending represented less than 2% of GDP.50
This same day saw Gillard respond to a February 7, 2013 written question
from Rep. Stuart Robert (LIB-Fadden) concerning governmental spending
on cybersecurity by noting that $A1.46 billion ($1.389 billion) was planned
for cybersecurity spending out to 2020 by various Department of Defence
entities.51
Defending Australia would not see further implementation due to the
decisive September 7, 2013 defeat of the Labour Government by a conservative Liberal-National Party government headed by new Prime Minister
Tony Abbott (LIB-Warringah). 52
Numerous positive and more numerous critical reviews were made of
Defending Australia in a series of articles published in a special issue of the
Australian defense journal Security Challenges published by the Institute for
Regional Security. Attributes of this document mentioned in these articles
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included recognizing that territorial disputes in Southeast and Northeast Asia
are directly linked to regional states concerns about Chinese military modernization; recognizing the need to achieve proper balance between capability
and risk within financial resources; emphasizing the importance of building
trust in defense and security partnerships and that such trust must extend
across governments and societies; praised the U.S. Marine Corps rotation
through Darwin; indicating that the U.S. alliance may become more important in the future; approved Plan Beersheba which seeks to structure the
Army into three multi-role combat brigades; and implicitly recognizing the
need for Australia to have a maritime capability to protect trade and essential
materials from being attacked at sea; and commending the documents’
emphasis on ADF personnel education and training and strengthening treatment for those experiencing mental health and post-traumatic stress. Another
journal’s analysis of Australian governmental national security policy
planning during this period stressed that Gillard did a better job than Rudd in
stabilizing Australian strategic posture and upgrading Canberra’s alliance with
the U.S and keeping the U.S. engaged in Asia.53
These instances of praise were more than counteracted by often lacerating
criticism of deficiencies documented by report critics. These included describing a more positive strategic outlook than its 2009 predecessor without
changing force structure other than adding extra electronic Growler aircraft;
failing to match ends with means by not going beyond broad statements of
objectives without explaining how to achieve such objectives through explicit
domestic reforms, enhancing resource allocation to priority purposes, effective
outreach within and beyond Australia, hedging strategies against future contingencies; and failing to deliver means matching ends and resources required
for these capabilities.54
Additional criticisms of the 2013 White Paper included failing to justify
the number of aircraft, ships, submarines, and battalions the government intends to purchase with taxpayer dollars; failing to link the activity of defense
engagement with desired outcomes through a strategic concept; how seeking
regional engagement relates to Australian defense; increased financial costs
including choosing financially risky options to replace the troubled Collins
class submarines and maintaining the F-A/18 F Super Hornet; the soon to be
acquired F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and Growler electronic warfare aircraft
means maintaining three different combat aircraft fleets in subsequent
decades; failing to recognize that prior defense funding cuts will diminish
Australia’s ability to address aerospace combat threats between 2020–2030
and that aspiring to be a middle-ranked military power without realistic
funding commitments is not sustainable; and failing to include operational
planning for cyberwarfare in the white paper along with not articulating
39

operational planning for electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures
into Australian military planning and strategy.55
Plans for a 2015 white paper, initiated by Abbott and Defense Minister
Kevin Andrews (LIB-Menzies), began following the conservative coalition’s
victory in the 2013 election. This paper’s release was delayed until 2016 for
numerous reasons including turmoil within the governing Liberal Party
personified by dissatisfaction with Abbott’s leadership style which resulted
in him being toppled on September 14, 2015 by Malcolm Turnbull (LIBWentworth) who became Prime Minister and appointed Senator Marisa
Payne (LIB-NSW) as Defense Minister.56
This interim period provided frequent opportunity for those interested in
Australian national security policy topics to make their recommendations on
what the next Australian defense white paper should include and how the
government should implement document contents into its national security
policymaking. A 2014 Naval War College Review article noted that ADF
operations had transitioned from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region
due to shifting global economic power and strategic competition transitioning
to this region, the increasing importance of Australian trade and investment
in this region, and the U.S.’ shifting to the Asia-Pacific. During the Abbott
Government’s early months in April 2014, an analysis from the security
policy think-tank the Kokoda Foundation made the following points about
what was expected to be a 2015 defense white paper including:
 Being open about Australia’s worsening strategic environment and how
the defense budget must provide force options for protecting large and growing national interests and a roadmap for straightening out the defense budget
and modernizing defense capabilities.
 The next White Paper needs to make a clear choice about Australia’s
future strategic role; design a defense force consistent with that role; commit
necessary defense resources; provide sufficient industry and confidence to
enable state government and the defense industry to support defense; and
provide confidence that this white paper will be implemented and governmental commitment to it sustained.
 Needs to address China’s military buildup and modernization while encouraging Beijing’s peaceful rise and that regional strategic competition
does not lead to conflict.
 Stressing Australia’s desire to create and increase regional defense partnerships enhancing regional security while addressing American desires that
Australia enhance its regional security commitments and provide move overt
support to the U.S. in the event of increased competition between the U.S.
and China;
 Ensuring Australian international defense engagement goals are based on
a realistic assessment of strategic risk, a clear set of national defense objec40

tives, and a range of capabilities to advance these objectives augmented by
short and long-term funds.
 Emphasizing future defense technologies including microsystems, nanotechnology, unmanned and autonomous systems, communications and sensors, digital technology, biological and material sciences, energy and power
science, cognitive science, and neuro-technologies and their potential roles
in future Australian defense capabilities.57
A 2015 assessment of Australian defense white papers by a prominent
international affairs research institute analyst was scathing in its assessment
of these documents declaring:
Australia’s inability to clearly and succinctly define its defense
strategy is a perennial failing that will have serious policy and
operational consequences if not addressed. Australia’s recent
defence white papers are part of the problem: they lack coherence,
their messaging is poor, and many of their underlying assumptions
and planning practices are questionable.58

This assessment went on to advocate that the next white paper gave the
Abbott Government the chance to reset Australian defense and military
strategies. It advocated Australia replacing a maritime strategy with a “full
spectrum” defense planning approach providing protection against military
threats from space and cyberspace along with conventional air, land, and
seapower threats. This document also stressed that full spectrum defense
needed to be built on deeper and broader regional partnerships and by a risk
assessment process encouraging critical thinking about strategy and future
ADF capabilities.59
The proliferation of Internet technology, including social media such as
blogs and Twitter, allows individual Australian political figures and defense
oriented research institutions to comment on and attempt to influence Australian international relations and national security policymaking. Examples
of Australian defense oriented blogs and discussion forums include the
Institute for Regional Security (previously the Kokoda Foundation) http://
www.regionalsecurity.org.au/; the Lowy Institute’s Lowy Interpreter http://
www.lowyinterpreter.org/; the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
The Strategist http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/; Australian National University’s Crawford School of Public Policy’s East Asia Forum http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/about/; and this university’s New Mandala http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/ focusing on Southeast Asian developments.
An example of an individual blogger on national defense issues is The
Murphy Raid http://andrewzammit.org/. Compiled and maintained by University of Melbourne Ph.D. Candidate Andrew Zammit, this site, named for a
raid on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) on March
16, 1973 ordered by then Attorney General Lionel Murphy who suspected
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ASIO of withholding information on terrorist threats and undermining the
newly elected Gough Whitlam Government, features this writer’s comments
on defense and security matters. Australian political figures with Twitter
accounts providing insight on defense issues include Defense Minister and
Senator Marise Payne https://twitter.com/MarisePayne; Senator Jacqui Lambie
(IND-Tasmania) https://twitter.com/JacquiLambie; and Senator Peter WhishWilson (GRN-Tasmania) https://twitter.com/SenatorSurfer. While it is debatable how influential social media comment is in formulating Australian
defense policy, there is a growing interest in using social media to advance
or defeat various defense policy proposals.60
The Defense Department invited public submissions in a crowdsourcing
initiative for desirable content to include in historic and contemporary defense
white papers. It received 269 public submissions for the newest White Paper
with 208 of those submitting material consenting to its publication.61 These
submissions originate from multiple individuals and organizations representing a variegated spectrum of perspectives on Australian national security
issues. University of Queensland Senior Lecturer in International Relations
Dr. Matt McDonald urged the Defence Department to develop a climate
change strategy stressing his belief that climate change could impact homeland
security resources; military capabilities; personnel well-being and procurement. He also urged the white paper examine how climate change could impact domestic and international disaster relief, large-scale regional population
movements; and that the Defence Department and ADF integrate emissions
reduction planning into their programs.62
The Sydney Aerospace & Defence Interest Group urged Australia to
adopt international best practices for industry support and including strategic
local sourcing as a long term policy; the Defence Department providing a
clear statement of the critical capabilities required of local industries and
linking this to the national defense strategy; providing a clear policy for
sustaining defense acquisitions in the white paper; simplifying the defense
contracting policy to make it less complex and costly for off-the-shelf and
minor projects; and considering transferring defense industrial policy to the
Department of Industry.63
Australia’s Northrup-Grumman subsidiary noted the rapidly changing and
evolving international security technology environment urging the next white
paper to explore the impact of evolving asymmetrical adversarial threat to
satellite communication systems (SATCOM) on the full spectrum of military
operations and exploring potential benefits of a national SATCOM system
which is interoperable with the USAF’s protected SATCOM system. 64 The
Marrickville, NSW Peace Group presented a polemical treatise questioning
the value of the Australian-U.S. alliance which it complained compromised
Australian independence and national interests. This screed went on to claim
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that the 2003 Iraq War violated international law, denounced the 2011
stationing of U.S. Marines in Darwin, criticized embedding the ballistic
missile frigate HMAS Sydney into the U.S. Seventh Fleet during 2013–2014;
criticized Australian intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance cooperation with the U.S. at the Pine Gap, and fretted about potential Australian
military involvement in a confrontation with China.65
The Navy League of Australia stressed Australia’s historic and contemporary role as a maritime nation and its critical dependence on imports and
exports. Specific white paper recommendations made by this organization
included Australian defense spending being at least 2% of GDP; that Australia be able to defend its air and sea space; that the military’s primary role
is warfighting, that RAN surface and subsurface combat capabilities must be
strengthened; that new submarines should be purchased and include land
attack cruise missiles and mines; and that naval bases at Broome, Cairns, and
Darwin be enhanced. 66
The Returned & Services League (RSL), Australia’s primary veterans
organization, stressed that main threats to national security include an uncertain global strategic outlook, weak economic forecasts for nations considered
stable, the rise of quickly emerging mass civil disobedience movements
assisted by social media causing governments to fall, ongoing tensions from
nuclear proliferation and territorial disputes, and the rise of ISIS and other
militant religious movements. RSL supported the U.S. rebalance to Asia but
remains skeptical about its implementation, wants to improve ADF deficiencies in housing and childcare which make retaining personnel problematic,
expressed concern with spousal health insurance coverage want a service
member retires, and urges that changes in military justice legislation conform
to comparable civil law changes.67
In November 2015 ASPI released three consultation documents describing
capabilities of individual ADF branches. The assessment for the RAAF
mentioned it was recapitalizing its entire aircraft fleet from basic trainers to
frontline tactical strike fighters. In addition, it noted the introduction of
unmanned aerial systems and developing an intellectual framework for Air
Operations known as Plan Jericho. Positive changes in RAAF capabilities
since 2010 were noted in air control and strike, air mobility, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and command and control. Capability deficiencies since 2010 were listed as being in air mobility and tactical battlefield airlift which were assessed as being low risk, antisubmarine warfare
assessed as being medium to high-risk, and force generation and sustainment
and fuel supply vulnerability which were assessed as being medium risk.68
ASPI’s RAN capability assessment stressed that RAN had legacy platforms
in service such as Adelaide-class frigates which were past their peak but that
new platforms, including combat helicopters, helicopter landing docks,
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amphibious lift, and air warfare destroyers were being delivered and would
provide capability enhancements. ASPI also noted plans to rebuild the fleet
over the next couple of decades. Capability shortfalls stressed by this
document include submarine capability which was judged as being medium
risk, antisubmarine warfare assessed as being medium/high risk, and patrol
and mine-hunting vessels evaluated at medium risk to due Armidale-class
patrol boats serviceability declining as a result of extensive use in maritime
border protection operations.69
ASPI’s Australian Army capability assessment mentioned that for the
previous 15 years the Army’s focus has been on sustaining combat training,
stabilization, and peacekeeping operations in adjacent regions and Mideast
and Afghanistan theaters. These have placed demands on ADF operational
tempo and begin a major rethinking of Army structure under Plan Beersheba
which will involve three similar brigades make rotational deployments more
manageable and sustainable. Positive Army capability changes noted since
2010 include in artillery, small arms, personal protection, and ground and
protected mobility. Static changes include armor capability, aviation, and
command and control which may move into positive territory if new
acquisitions such as CH-47 Chinook helicopters and systems digitization
occur. Capability shortfalls include protected mobility and armored fighting
vehicles which are assessed as medium risk; airborne armed reconnaissance
assessed as medium to low risk; land-based air defense assessed as medium
risk but will become more important due to proliferating armed drone
systems; and lack of depth in specialized personnel in intelligence, medical,
and combat support services assessed as medium risk.70
The 2016 defense white paper was released on February 25, 2016 by Turnbull and Payne and broken into three parts including a conventional policy
declaration, budget justification, and statement of defense industry capabilities. This document sought to describe Australian defense needs out until
2035 while identifying security challenges likely to confront Australia while
examining defense capabilities needed by the ADF and the Department of
Defence to meet these threats. An executive summary of this document contended:
While Australia has effective defence capabilities to draw on to
meet current security challenges, significant under-investment in
Defence in the past and the deferral of decisions about future
major capabilities need to be fixed. Defence’s capability plans
have become disconnected from defence strategy and resources,
delaying important investments in Australia’s future security and
frustrating Australian defence industry.71
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Source: Australian Department of Defence

Salient points addressed in the 2016 Defence White Paper included the IndoPacific region providing 50% of the world’s economic output by 2050; a
strong U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and globally has played a key role in
promoting regional peace and security over the past 70 years; that while
there is remote prospect of Australia being directly attacked by another
country in the foreseeable future that Australian strategic planning is not
limited to border defense, but must encompass the behaviors of countries
and terrorists; and that terrorism will continue evolving in ways threatening
Australian interests. This document also stressed that regional instability
could have adverse strategic consequences; that Australia must maintain its
technological edge and capabilities superiority which will be challenged by
regional military modernization; that the next 20 years will see regional
military forces operate with unprecedented range and precision; the exceptional significance of Chinese military modernization; and that cyberattacks
threaten the ADF’s warfighting capabilities, government agencies, and various
sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure.72
Three key strategic defense emphases of the 2016 defense white paper
include deterring, denying, and defeating attempts by hostile countries and
non-state actors to threaten or coerce Australia by being able to decisively
and independently respond to military threats such as incursions into Australia’s air, sea, and northern approaches; securing adjacent areas encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; and building a stable
Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order supporting national interests
by working closely with the U.S. Specific applications of these objectives
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involve the agility, capability, and potency of the ADF; providing ADF with
comprehensive situational awareness; strengthening defense intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; enhancing cyber defense and the
cyber workforce; increasing the submarine force from 6 to 12 with high
interoperability with U.S. submarines; expanding surface naval capability
with three Hobart class air warfare destroyers and a new class of nine future
frigates supported by replenishment vessels; expanding combat aircraft
capabilities with the F-35 A Lightning, F/A-18 Super Hornet, and E/A-18G
Growler; and expanding land force capabilities with new generation armored
combat reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles, a new long-range
rocket system, adding drone aircraft to enhance land force surveillance and
protection, and upgrading bases and ADF logistical capabilities.73
A supplemental volume to the white paper includes cost estimates for
these defense aspirations called the Integrated Defence Investment Program.
This document provides financial estimate for defense spending program
areas encompassing future defense force capability, the defense work force,
decision-making superiority; enabled mobile and sustainable forces; and
coverage of areas such as air and sea lift; maritime and anti-submarine
warfare; strike and air combat; and land combat and amphibious warfare.74

Source: Australian Department of Defence

Specific quantitative measurements indicated in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program include $A195 billion ($144.992 billion) on defense spending
through 2025–2026; increasing ADF workforce size to 62,400 between now
and 2025–2026; and structuring defense spending in the following capability
streams by 2025–2026:
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Air and Sea Lift 6%
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Space, and Cyber
Warfare 9%
Key Enablers (Infrastructure Maximizing Force Effectiveness) 25%
Maritime and Anti-Submarine Warfare 25%
Strike and Air Combat 17%
Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 18%.75

Additional budgetary spending targets projected for the ADF in the next
decade and beyond include:
Program Title

Time Frame

Military Satellite Capability

Approved

Electronic Warfare Operational Support

Scheduled for
Approval
2017–2030

High Altitude Unmanned Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
System
Satellite Imagery Capability

2023–2039

Long-Range Electronic Warfare Support
Aircraft
Enhanced Jindalee Operational Radar
Network
Intelligence Systems

2017–2024

Space Situational Awareness System and
Radars
Distributed Ground Station Australia

2018–2033

Position, Navigation, and Timing Capability

2019–2033

Common Operating Picture Capability
Program
Land-Based Geospatial Support Systems

2017–2033

Joint Electronic Warfare Integration
Program
Identification Friend or Foe and Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Systems
Lead-In Fighter Training System

2016–2033

Garden Island Defence Precinct
Redevelopment
HMAS Cerburus Redevelopment

2017–2025

New Northern Ordnance Explosives
Storage Facility
Mobile Threat and Target Emitter System

2017–2023

2017–2026
2016–2031

2019–2029

2017–2025

Scheduled for
Approval
2022–2033

2016–2024

2016–2021
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Approximate Investment
Value
$A507 million ($376.980
million)
$A100–200 million ($74.355–
$148.710 million)
$A3-4 billion ($2.230.650–
$2.974.200 billion)
$A 3–4 billion ($2.230.650–
$2.974.200 billion)
$A 2–3 billion ($1.487.100–
$2.230.650 billion)
$A 1–2 billion ($743.550
million–$1.487.100 billion)
$A 2–3 billion ($1.487.100–
$2.230.650 billion)
$A 1–2 billion ($743.550
million–$1.487.100 billion)
$A 1–2 billion ($743.550
million–$1.487.100 billion)
$A 750 million–$1 billion
($557.633–$743.550 million)
$A500–600 million
($371.775–$446.130 million)
$A 400–500 million
($297.420–$371.75 million)
$A 400-500 million
($297.420–$371.75 million)
$A 400–500 million
($297.420–$371.75 million)
$A 4–5 billion ($2.974.200–
$3.717.750 billion)
$A 500–700 million ($371.75
million–$446.130 million)
$A 400–500 million
($297.420–$371.75million)
$A 300–400 million
($223.065–$297.420 million)
$A 200–300 million
($148.710–$223.065
million)76

Defence Industry Policy Statement
This document stresses areas in which Australia’s indigenous defense industry
is capable of meeting ADF needs and which areas where it is not meeting
Australian military needs. It is broken up into sections covering the partnership between the Department of Defence and the defense industry; a section
on delivering defense capability and the proposed establishment of The Centre for Defence Industry Capability; developing new approaches to defense
innovation such as a Next Generation Technologies Fund and defense
innovation hub and portal; driving competitiveness and export potential; and
cutting red tape to enhance defense efficiency.77
This document notes Australian defense industry triumphs including developing high-edge leading end phased array radar in Canberra, nextgeneration protected Hawkei vehicles in Bendigo, VIC, and developing the
F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, and that approximately 3,000 small
to medium enterprises support the Australian defense industry. Examples of
these companies include the Western Australian company VEEM Ltd. providing maintenance support for Special Air Service regiment Supacat vehicles,
South Australia’s Levett Engineering manufacturing precision components for
the Joint Strike Fighter and Collins submarine program; New South Wales
Bales Defence Industries supplying weapons storage systems, and Victoria’s
Sentient Vision Systems specializing in video analysis software and surveillance video small optic detection.78

Source: Australian Department of Defence
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The proposed Centre for Defence Industry Capability will receive funding of
$A 230 million ($218.863 million) through 2025–2026; next generation
technologies will be funded at $A 730 million ($694.653 million) during this
time period, the defence innovation hub will be funded at $A640 million
($609.011 million) during period; constructing surface warships will become
a priority; a Defence Industrial Capability Plan, is supposed to be released in
the second quarter of 2017; fuel management will become an increasing area
of emphasis for ADF and the defense industry; and the Defence Innovation
Portal is intended to enhance engagement between the Defense Department
and innovation activities nationally. The Next Generation Technologies fund
will prioritize the following areas:
 Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
 Space Capabilities
 Enhanced Human Performance
 Medical Countermeasure Products
 Multidisciplinary Material Sciences
 Quantum Technologies
 Trusted Autonomous Systems
 Cyber
 Advanced Sensors, Hypersonics and Directed Energy Capabilities.79
Analysis and Reaction
Australia has an extremely capable military and defense industry and its
defense white papers have sought to incorporate Australian geopolitical,
diplomatic, and military aspirations within the limits of economic resources
and domestic political will. The 2016 Defense White Paper reflects Australia’s
ambitions, but it remains to be seen whether Australia will be able to match
and sustain its defense policy objectives in the years to come. An article in
the conservative The Australian praised the white paper for producing a “surprisingly comprehensive military blueprint that-because it is costed-holds
has a chance of becoming reality. This article also lauded the document for
seeking to make Australia a muscular regional power by creating its most
powerful naval force in peacetime. Additional approval of this document
stressed its candid criticism of China’s military buildup and constructing
artificial islands in the South China Sea, for Canberra’s commitment to
spend 2% of GDP on defense, and for trying to align strategy, capability, and
resources into a single document.80
Concerns expressed by The Australian included optimistic assumptions
made on naval shipbuilding projects despite recent cost overruns and
schedule delays in the program to build three new air warfare destroyers, not
discussing how the ADF intends to recruit the extra 5,000 personnel it will
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need to run its force of new warships, aircraft, and army equipment as its size
increases to 62,400 in the next decade, the RAN needing to find crews to
man its incoming boats, and finding money to lure engineers and technicians
from the mining industry. Another assessment in this source observed that
Indian and Pacific Ocean waters would be patrolled by more than 70
Chinese submarines by 2020, the increasing deployment by Asian militaries
of drones, longer range fighter aircraft, and ballistic missiles potentially
capable of threatening Australian territory including China’s CSS-4 and DF31 and North Korea’s Taepodong-2. A third assessment from this source
stressed the importance of the ADF having intelligence capabilities to monitor
threats from submarines, Mideast and Asia-Pacific terrorism, and cyber
warfare against government agencies and industry.81
Early parliamentary reaction to the 2016 White Paper was varied. On
February 25, 2016, Prime Minister Turnbull stressed that Australia’s security
was the government’s highest priority stressing that this document desired to
enhance Australian military power across land, sea, and air and it would
enhance Australian capabilities in these areas along with being fully costed,
enhancing, tow force resilience, geared toward enhancing the Australian
defense industry by enhancing spending within Australia. Foreign Minister
Julie Bishop (LIB-Curtin) stressed that the white paper would enable Australia to develop deeper partnerships with the U.S. and other national allies,
strengthen Australian defense cooperation and presence in Southeast Asia,
the South Pacific, and Northeast Asia, and in areas including counterterrorism,
maritime security, science and technology, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and maintaining a rules-based international order.82
On February 29, 2016, Rep. Tony Zappia (LAB-Makin) criticized the
delays in releasing the white paper and expressed concern on behalf of his
South Australian constituents that this document contained no guarantees
about when submarines and offshore patrol vessels will be built. He also
complained that shipping construction commitments were election promises
that the government could not be trusted to deliver on. 83 Parliamentary
debate on March 2, 2016 saw Labour Party leader Rep. Bill Shorten (LABMaribyorng) question Turnbull about newspaper reports concerning leaked
national security documents concerning the timing of the future deployment
of Australian submarines mentioning former Prime Minister Abbott who
denied leaking the documents. Turnbull replied that the Australian Federal
Police had started an investigation into this leak.84
Finally, a March 4, 2016 Lowy Institute paper criticized the white paper
for not specifying how increased defense spending will be paid for and asked
whether this would occur from selling tax increases and other governmental
expenditure savings in an environment of increasing demands on social ser50

vices and health costs, an eroding tax base, and projections of slowing global
economic growth.85
The following tables quantify Australian defense spending in U.S. dollars,
as share of GDP, and personnel size from 2010–2015 encompassing both
Rudd Governments, and the Gillard, Abbott, and Turnbull governments.
Australian Defense Spending 2010–2015 U.S. Dollars
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

$26.993 billion
$26.597 billion
$25.665 billion
$25.442 billion
$27.171 billion
$22.764 billion86

Australian Defense Spending GDP Share 2010–2014
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

1.9%
1.8%
1.7%
1.63%
1.65%
1.83%87

Australian Military and Civilian Workforce June 30, 2013–June 30, 2015
Royal Australian Air Force
Australian Army
Royal Australian Navy
Australian Public Service (APS) Dept. of
Defence Civilian Workforce

13,934
28,568
13,862
19,988

14,076
29,366
14,070
18,787

+142
+798
+208
-1,20188

Conclusion
Australian power projection is dependent on the logistical need to cover
great distances to reach operational theaters since its landmass consists of
7,682,300 square kilometers, its water area encompasses 58,920 square kilometers, and its coastline encompasses 25,760 square kilometers. Australia’s
population was 24,022,042 on March 9, 2016.89 Due to significant quantities
of the Australian landmass being covered by the desert outback, the majority
of Australia’s population is located on the Boomerang Coast covering from
Queensland to parts of South Australia incorporating the eastern and southeastern parts of the country. This is demonstrated by the states of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia having a June 30,
2015 population of 19,534,300 representing 81% of Australia’s population.
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New South Wales
Victoria
Queensland
South Australia
Western Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
Australian Capital Territory

7,618,200
5,938,100
4,779,400
1,698,600
2,591,600
516,600
244,600
390,80090

This population concentration along Australia’s Boomerang Coast is reflected
in this map of Australian military bases:

Source: Australian Dept. of Defence

The phrase “The Tyranny of Distance” has been used by the eminent Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey to describe Australia’s traditional geographic
distance from most of the world’s economic and strategic markets. However,
this isolation has lessened in an era of globalization, precision guided munitions, ballistic missiles, and Internet connectivity including cyber warfare. It
is 3,419 miles from Australia’s largest city Sydney to Jakarta, Indonesia;
5,542 miles from Sydney to Beijing; 4,842 miles from Sydney to Tokyo;
5,155 miles from Sydney to Seoul; and 4,814 miles from Sydney to Hanoi.
This technological diminishing of distance makes Australia increasingly
vulnerable to security threats such as disorder in Pacific Islands nations such
as the Solomon Islands, illegal airborne and seaborne mass migration, dis52

ruptions in trade routes in the South China Sea and Malacca Straits, North
Korean ballistic missiles, and increasing Chinese military spending and
assertiveness. All of these factors are producing an increased emphasis on
greater international security cooperation by Australia and have been incorporated into the 2016 defense white paper and must be recognized by current
and future Australian national security policymakers.91
These security developments, including the threat of Islamist terror demonstrated by the December 15–16, 2014 hostage crisis at Sydney’s Martin Place
Lindt Chocolate café hear the Reserve Bank of Australia, provide ample justification for Australia increasing its defense spending and security vigilance.
This justification is further amplified by Asia and Australasia representing
22.8% of world global defense spending in 2015; Asian defense spending
increasing nearly 6% annually between 2013–2015; Chinese defense spending increasing 19.8% in 2014–2015; Chinese cruiser, destroyer, and frigate
strength reaching 73; Beijing’s tactical aircraft fleet of 1,084; and Chinese
defense spending representing 41% of Asian and Australasian countries
defense spending.92
Australia probably has the economic resources to sustain the defense
spending advocated in the 2016 defense white paper. However, there are
problems within Australian government and politics that make successful
sustainment of these defense spending commitments problematic. The first is
the short-term nature of Australia’s electoral cycle. Australian federal elections
are held at least every three years and may be held more frequently if
requested by the Prime Minister and approved by the Governor-General.
This makes sustaining long-term governmental and public commitment for
programs uncertain.93
A more serious problem has been chronic political volatility and internecine factional fighting within Australia’s governing parties the Labour Party
and the Liberal-National Party coalition since 2007 when Labour defeated
the Coalition Government of John Howard which served from 1996–2007.
During Labour’s 2007–2013 administration, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was
toppled by Julia Gillard on June 23–24, 2010 and Gillard would eventually
toppled by Rudd on June 25, 2013. Rudd and Labour would go on to lose the
September 7, 2013 election to the Coalition lead by the new Prime Minister
Tony Abbott. However, Abbott would encounter increasing dissatisfaction
within Coalition ranks about his leadership style and would be toppled by
Malcolm Turnbull on September 14, 2015 giving Australia five Prime
Ministers in an eight year period. Such governmental volatility is more
reflective of a dysfunctional developing country instead of one the world’s
most advanced democracies, economies, governments, and militaries. In
addition, the three year mandate for parliamentary elections means Australia
will have another parliamentary election sometime during 2016.94
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Australia also faces economic challenges in meeting the ambitious defense
spending objectives set out in the 2016 defense white paper. While it had a
GDP of $1.455 trillion in 2014, its economic growth rates have fluctuated
increasing 2.7% in 2011; 3.6% in 2012; 2.4% in 2013; 2.5% in 2014, and
2.2% in 2015, and its economic growth is heavily dependent on exports;
particularly minerals to export markets such as China and Japan which rank
as Australia’s two largest trading partners with the following Asia-Pacific
countries South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, and
India ranking among Australia’s top ten leading trading partners.95
China’s current economic difficulties have decreased Beijing’s demand
for Australian natural resources which has resulted in declining commodity
prices and had an adverse impact on Australian government revenues. In
December 2015, Australian Treasurer Scott Morrison (LIB-Cook) released
the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2015–16. This document stressed
that Australia’s budget deficit is expected to decline from $A 37.4 billion
($27.907 billion) (2.3% of GDP) in 2015–2016 to $A14.2 billion ($10.595
billion (0.7% of GDP) in 2018–2019 and that net national debt is expected to
peak at 18.5% of GDP in 2017–2018 and then decline in the medium term.
Additionally economic growth of 2.75% was forecast in 2016–2017 due to
historically low interest rates, a falling Australian dollar, lower oil prices, and
increasing Australian economic diversification away from resource investmentled growth. This growth could be achieved if government projections of
unemployment falling from 6% in 2014 to 5.5% by 2018–2019 are correct
and with implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and free trade
agreements with China, Japan, and South Korea.96
Australia’s commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defense is laudable,
but this NATO benchmark has been criticized for not measuring burden
sharing or quantifying risk sharing. A Carnegie Europe study noted that
Greece spends more than 2% of its GDP on defense, but that its military is
unable to project significant force across time and space. During the apogee
of NATO’s 2012-surge in Afghanistan, Greece had just 160 troops representing 1.2% of allied forces and by December 2014 Athens only had 9 troops
representing .02% of the 41,000 NATO force in Afghanistan. In contrast,
Denmark has spent approximately 1.5% of its GDP on defense since 2000.
However, Denmark’s highly capable and deployable military contributed 750
military forces at the height of the Afghanistan surge and maintained 130
personnel in theater at the end of 2004. Copenhagen also contributed seven
of the 185 aircraft involved in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector against
Libya in 2011 as opposed to just five Greek aircraft. Effective analysis of
military spending should also include metrics such as force deployability
capability and the ability of armed forces to engage in sustained military
operations.97
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The $22.764 billion of Australian defense spending is dwarfed by the
government’s 2015–2016 social services portfolio budget of $A 154 billion
($115.434 billion) and health expenditures of $A 69.4 billion $51.784 billion
representing over 49% of Australia’s $A 434.5 billion ($324.215 billion)
government budget for 2015–2016 as broken down by this pie chart.98

Source: Australia Commonwealth Treasurer

Australian military forces need agility, flexibility, and striking power to defeat
aggression and instability threats from multiple sources including turmoil in
adjoining Pacific Island nation states, threats to critical supply lines such as
the South China Sea, cyber attacks, and illegal immigration which could be
used as a means for infiltrating Islamist terrorists to augment Islamist cells.
During 2014–2015, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) conducted eight
operations resulting in 25 individuals being charged with terrorism and other
offenses. AFP also announced that the Syria–Iraq conflict is of particular
concern as it is causing an increasing number of Australians to fight in this
conflict and return to Australia radicalized and willing to conduct operations
on Australian soil. This conflict also places Australians traveling to Southeast Asia at greater risk to terrorist attack.99
The ADF also needs to bolster its ballistic missile defenses against
emerging threats from China and North Korea, enhance its submarine assets
to deal with the increasing presence of Chinese submarines in Indo-Pacific
Ocean waters, and maintain its commitment to building and maintaining
RAAF capabilities in fighter, interceptor, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance aircraft to defend its airspace. Enhancing the striking power
and survivability of its Army is also critical as is maintaining an agile and
robust intelligence infrastructure to deal with emerging national security
threats from foreign and indigenous sources.
Australia also needs to strengthen the ANZUS pact to incorporate it into
emerging Asian relationships and institutions. This would enhance Australia’s
regional posture and make it a more effective U.S. ally with particular regional
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expertise. Canberra could help China find ways to enhance its integration
into the regional order and adhere to international norms. The U.S. has
encouraged greater defense cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and
South Korea working with these countries to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. Intelligence cooperation between
the U.S. and Australia as part of the Five Eyes Network whose membership
also consists of Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom continues
increasing. The U.S. must be careful not to take Australian support for
granted in the event of a security crisis with China, while recognizing that
Asian countries having concerns about U.S. regional staying power due to
America’s deteriorating economics and political conflict between Congress
and the President.100
The Turnbull Government’s 2016 defense white paper has a laudable and
realistic vision of the emerging strategic environment facing Australia. It was
produced through a transparent process inviting and receiving significant
public feedback. This document’s willingness to back this up with resources
and support for Australia’s defense industry is commendable. It remains to
be seen whether Turnbull or later Australian Prime Ministers of both governing parties are willing and able to sustain this commitment to enhancing the
ADF given the continuing public demand for domestic social programs by
going against public opinion for additional government sustenance by
trimming such programs or slowing their funding growth. Ending internecine
intraparty strife is crucial for stability in Australian national security policymaking, as is some level of bipartisan agreement on Canberra’s national
security objectives and role in the world. Civilian and military Australian
national security policy analysts and policymakers will engage in ongoing
reviews and updates of domestic and international economics, public opinion,
military capabilities and trends, to determine if Australia’s 2016 defense white
paper sufficiently addresses Australia’s emerging national security requirements.
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